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Taxidermied animals provide an important source of information about the natural world, 
but failure to understand their reality status may result in missed learning opportunities for 
museum visitors. This study explored 4–10 year-old children’s and adults’ (n=207) reality 
status judgments, and biological and authenticity property attributions for a taxidermied 
rabbit during a museum visit. The aim was to examine their understanding of its former 
status as a living animal and its current status as an authentic piece of natural history, under 
different presentation conditions, including: 1) as a touchable exhibit; 2) inside an exhibition 
case – untouchable; and 3) an experimental context paired with a toy rabbit – both 
touchable. Analysis revealed that there was an increase with age both in judgments that 
taxidermy was real and authentic and in accuracy of biological property attributions. The toy 
condition resulted in more accurate reality judgments, whereas the touchable condition 
resulted in more accurate biological property attributions. There was no effect of age or 
condition on authenticity property attributions. Accuracy of biological property attributions 
was also associated with reality status judgments, whereby understanding the real and 
authentic nature of taxidermy was associated with understanding its biological status. 
Implications for the development of biological cognition and museum learning are 
discussed.  
Keywords: biological cognition; categorisation; reality status; conceptual development; 
informal learning; museums 
 




Still life? Children’s understanding of the reality status of museum taxidermy  
 
Encounters with animal taxidermy provide important opportunities for children to 
learn about the natural world, but the educational benefit of such encounters relies, to an 
extent, on an accurate understanding of their reality status (Bunce, 2016a; Bunce 2016b; 
Dillon, DeWitt, Pegram, Irwin, Crowley et al., 2016; Evans, Mull, & Poling, 2002; Hampp & 
Schwan, 2014; Kirchberg & Tröndle, 2012; Leinhardt & Crowley, 2002; Sanders & 
Hohenstein, 2015; Watson & Werb, 2013). Taxidermy involves preserving an animal’s skin in 
a way that provides an authentic portrayal of the external anatomical features of a 
previously living animal (Guild of Taxidermists, 2015). Taxidermied animals are commonly 
found in museums of natural history, but may also be encountered in art galleries, stately 
homes, hotels and restaurants, particularly in rural areas where hunting is common. The 
status of taxidermy, however, is likely to be confusing to children because taxidermy has 
characteristics of real and unreal entities. On the one hand, taxidermied animals are ‘real’ in 
that they comprise an animal’s skin that has been fashioned to provide a genuine 
representation of the animal. This skin has not been made from artificial materials, such as 
those used to make toy animals. On the other hand, they are not ‘real’ in the sense that 
they are not alive anymore. They were either killed for the purpose of taxidermy, or died 
naturally, and their biological tissue, including organs and bones, have been replaced with a 
wire frame and padded out with specialist stuffing material. In addition, some visible 
features such as the eyes are replaced with manufactured materials.  
The issue of whether something is real or not is inherently ambiguous because it 
depends on the object and the context (Bunce & Harris, 2008; 2012). For example, the 
question, ‘Is that lion real?’ could refer to living/nonliving status and seek to determine 




whether a particular lion is alive or dead. Equally, it could refer to authentic/artificial status 
and seek to determine whether a particular lion is genuine as opposed to artificial or fake, 
such as a person wearing a lion costume, or a life-size statue of a lion. Similarly, taxidermied 
animals could be considered real or not real in relation to their living/nonliving status or 
authentic/artificial status, and this may be dependent on the context. For example, 
taxidermy might be considered not real, i.e., not alive, when encountered alongside a pet or 
inside a stately home or art gallery, but be considered real, i.e., authentic, when 
encountered in a museum. The potentially confusing reality status of taxidermy is evident in 
the fact that one of the first questions children often ask when they encounter museum 
taxidermy is, ‘Is it real?’ (Kirk, 2012; Tunnicliffe, 1996). Given the importance of museums 
for providing informal learning opportunities, the current study sought to explore children’s 
interpretation of taxidermy in a museum context, and to establish: a) to what extent they 
intuitively categorise it as a real and authentic piece of natural history, and b) whether they 
can attribute properties on the basis of the living/nonliving distinction and the 
authentic/artificial distinction. 
To date, almost no research has explored how children categorise or make 
inferences about taxidermy. An exception is Tunnicliffe (1996), who observed British 
primary school children’s conversations about taxidermied animals during a museum visit, 
and compared these with another group of children’s conversations about live animals 
during a visit to a zoo. A large age range of children were included in the study from ‘5 years 
and under’ (p. 134) to 12 years, but the results are not systematically broken down by age. 
Overall, 66% of conversations about live animals concerned behaviours, including feeding, 
excreting, and moving, and 37% of conversations about taxidermy were also about 
behaviours. In contrast, taxidermy, but not live animals, elicited comments about ‘reality’ 




and ‘realness’. Tunnicliffe discussed how children in the museum appeared to use their 
biological knowledge to make sense of, and categorise taxidermied animals in terms of their 
previously living status. Thus, Tunnicliffe (1996) interpreted children as equating real with 
living/nonliving status, or ‘being alive or having been alive’ (p. 138). One child (in Year 3, i.e., 
7-8 years of age), for example, said of a taxidermy lion, ‘I wish it were real then I could sit on 
the back and ride it’ (p. 139). Children in this study did not appear to equate realness with 
being authentic, which is how adults and museum curators categorise museum taxidermy 
and other museum objects (Dillon et al., 2016; Frazier & Gelman, 2009; Kirk, 2012). Given 
this apparent developmental difference, and the absence of data about developmental 
changes in children’s understanding of taxidermy, the current study explored the 
development of children’s perceptions of the reality status of taxidermy.  
The way in which children categorise and make inferences about living things in the 
absence of formal instruction has been the subject of several decades of debate. There are 
two main schools of thought that vary in the extent to which they emphasise one of two 
cognitive mechanisms known to be influential during this process (Waxman & Gelman, 
2009). The first is perceptual or similarity-based approaches, initially advocated by Carey 
(1985), and supported by others including Sloutsky and Fisher (2004). This approach 
proposes that conceptual biological knowledge develops primarily on the basis of 
perceptual similarities, with children under 10 years of age favouring sensory cues relating 
to physical properties of entities when drawing inferences about new entities. The second 
approach, advocated by researchers including Gelman (e.g., Gelman, 2003), Keil (1989), and 
Inagaki and Hatano (2002), is conceptual or theory-based. It proposes that children’s 
knowledge is structured with reference to a set of beliefs that are embedded in naïve 
theories. Naïve theories are knowledge systems that contain information that enables 




children to make predictions and provide explanations in principled ways. In the biological 
domain, this information includes biological characteristics of entities and causal 
mechanisms involved in sustaining life (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002). Some studies have found 
that abstract categorical knowledge is available to children as young as 3 years (Gelman, 
2003).  
These two types of information may help children to interpret the reality status of 
taxidermy. On a basic perceptual or sensory level, taxidermy appears highly life-like in terms 
of its general appearance, and has authentic visible features such as real fur. On this basis, 
children may be expected to judge taxidermy as ‘real’. However, it is also unable to move, 
and movement is a core feature of children’s naïve biology that they use to distinguish 
between living and nonliving entities (Margett & Witherington, 2011). For example, children 
at 5 years of age have been shown to understand that animals, but not artifacts can move 
on their own and can self-start (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). Inability to move may indicate to 
children that taxidermy is not alive and, therefore, not real, which was the interpretation 
favoured by Tunnicliffe’s (1996) analysis of children’s responses to taxidermy. Although 
research by Gutheil, Bloom, Valderrama, and Freedman (2004) suggests that 3- and 4-year-
olds first attend to an object’s identity based on its current perceptual properties, Frazier 
and Gelman (2009) revealed that children this age have an emerging understanding that an 
item’s history or non-visible properties affect its nature. Based on these findings, the current 
study tested the hypothesis that children aged 3–4 years would judge museum taxidermy as 
not real because it is not alive, but with increasing age children, like adults, would use this 
information to conclude that it is authentic, and, therefore, real.  
To examine further what type of information children use to make reality judgments 
about taxidermy in the current study, they were asked to complete a property attribution 




task. In this task they had to decide whether a number of properties relating to the 
living/nonliving distinction and the authentic/artificial distinction applied to the taxidermy, 
for example whether it has a heart inside or whether it has real fur. In terms of children’s 
understanding of the authentic/artificial distinction, from the age of 2 years, children have 
been shown to contrast authentic or genuine objects and entities with fakes, imitations, or 
replicas in everyday life using the word ‘real’ (Bunce & Harris, 2008; Woolley & Wellman, 
1990). Preschoolers can also make reality status judgments about objects or entities on the 
basis of their authentic or artificial nature (Bunce & Harris, 2013; Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 
1987; Frazier & Gelman, 2009; Harris, Kavanaugh, & Meredith, 1994; Hood & Bloom, 2008; 
Woolley & Wellman, 1990). For example, in Bunce and Harris (2013), 3–5-year-olds judged 
animals, such as a sheep, as ‘real’ because they have ‘real skin’ and ‘the wool is real’, 
whereas toy sheep are not real because they have ‘not got the right wool’ and are ‘just 
plastic’. Children at 4 years of age have also been shown to understand that authentic 
objects including those that are original, such as the very first teddy bear, or objects that 
have a famous association, such as the president’s flag pin, belong in a museum, although 
performance improved with age (Frazier & Gelman, 2009). These data suggest that young 
children would demonstrate an understanding of the authentic features of taxidermy, but 
that this would increase with age, and this hypothesis was tested in the current study.  
Turning now to children’s property attributions according to the living/nonliving 
distinction, research has shown that children develop extensive biological knowledge during 
childhood. At 3 years of age, some children have an understanding of some core differences 
between animate and inanimate entities, for example, some children attribute biological 
properties including growth, breathing, and internal organs to animates, but not to 
inanimate entities, such as toys (Greif, Kemler Nelson, Keil & Gutierrez, 2006; Jipson & 




Gelman, 2007). By 5 years of age, children have been shown to differentiate between 
internal parts appropriate for animals and machines (Gottfried & Gelman, 2005), and 
understand that people, but not toy dolls, have brains (Scaife & Van Duuren, 1995). 
Between 5 and 6 years of age children have also been shown to recognise that living kinds 
need to take in food and are susceptible to illness (Inagaki & Hatano, 1996), and beyond 
that, at around 7 years, children can understand that the ultimate goal of bodily functioning 
is life and, conversely, that the breakdown of all bodily function results in death (Jaakkola & 
Slaughter, 2002; Rosengren, Gutiérrez, & Schein, 2014). On the basis of this research, it was 
expected that younger children in the current study would be able to demonstrate some 
understanding of the properties that apply to taxidermy on the basis of the living/nonliving 
distinction. It was also expected that there would be a developmental increase in accuracy 
between 4–5 years of age and 6–7 years of age, but that by the age of 8 years children’s 
performance would be comparable to that demonstrated by adults.  
The relation between property attributions and reality judgments was also 
considered in the present study. Sharon and Woolley (2004) noted the challenging nature of 
recognising the implications of property information for decisions about reality status, 
particularly when an entity has contradictory properties. In their research they found that 
there was a good level of consistency between 3- and 5-year-olds’ reality status judgments 
and subsequent property attributions for real and fantastical entities: children granted more 
human-like properties to entities that they had classed as real than those they had classed 
as fantastical, irrespective of the accuracy of their reality judgment. Following this, in the 
current study it was expected that there would be an association between participants’ 
reality status judgments and property attributions. Specifically, this study tested the 
hypothesis that the attribution of properties would be more accurate among participants 




who recognised the authentic status of taxidermy, or who recognised that it is not alive or 
used to be alive, than participants who judged it as not real because it is not authentic.  
To test these proposals, children aged 4–10 years, who were visiting a museum of 
natural history, were asked to justify their reality status judgments for a taxidermied animal, 
a rabbit, and to consider whether a number of properties applied to it, including whether it 
has a heart inside or needs to eat – biological properties, and whether it has real fur and 
eyes – authenticity properties. Given the absence of prior research, adult visitors were 
asked the same questions as the children to provide a measure against which to evaluate 
children’s performance. It was expected that adults would judge taxidermy as real because 
it is authentic, and that they would accurately attribute properties on the basis of the 
living/nonliving and authentic/artificial distinctions.  
This study also examined the influence of three conditions on participants’ reality 
judgments and property attributions. This was because these responses are dependent on 
the context in which they are sought and the structure of the task, both in children (Bunce & 
Harris, 2013; Gutheil, Vera, & Keil, 1998; Tullos & Woolley, 2009; Woolley & Van Reet, 
2006), and in adults (Kahneman, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Two conditions 
reflected the way in which taxidermy is curated in museums: 1) as a touchable object; and 
2) as an untouchable object enclosed in an exhibition case. The ability to touch and 
manipulate museum objects, as opposed to looking at them through an exhibition case, is 
thought to be beneficial in terms of enhancing engagement and learning (Paris, 2002; Pye, 
2008). Touching objects may enable visitors to better ‘decode’ the object (van Kraayenoord 
& Paris, 2002), and in doing so, may support their interpretation of and ability to construct 
meaning from it. This idea is supported by studies showing that visitors tend to spend longer 
interacting with museum objects that they can touch compared to those that they cannot 




(e.g., Diamond, 1986). Therefore, it was expected that both children and adults in the 
current study would make more accurate reality judgments and property attributions when 
taxidermy was touchable as opposed to when it was untouchable because it was inside an 
exhibition case.  
The third condition was experimental and involved presenting a toy rabbit alongside 
the taxidermied rabbit. In this condition, participants were able to touch both the toy and 
the taxidermy, but they had additional information compared with the other two conditions 
in the form of a point of reference provided by the toy equivalent of the taxidermy. The 
benefit of presenting pairs of real and unreal entities for children’s reality status judgments 
was found in Bunce and Harris (2013). For example, when children were shown a 
photograph of a toy sheep and a photograph of a real sheep as a pair, children made more 
accurate reality judgments. Bunce and Harris (2013) argued that the real and unreal pairing 
encouraged children actively to compare the two entities, and make relevant contrasts 
between them. Therefore, it was expected that participants in the current study would 
make more accurate reality judgments and property attributions in the toy condition 





In total, 233 museum visitors took part. Data for 26 participants were excluded 
owing to interference from another person during testing (n=5), the presence of a 
developmental disorder (n=2), or a consistent ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response bias to more than 80% 
of the questions coupled with an uninformative justification (for example uninformative 




justifications please see section ‘Reality judgments’) (n=19). This resulted in a final sample of 
207 (see Table 1). The adults who took part were not related to the child participants. Most 
of the final sample described themselves as white (n=183, 88%, 3 missing), living in the UK 
(n=184, 89%, 6 missing), and had previously visited a natural history museum in the past 
two years at least once (n=157, 76%). Most adults and caregivers of the children were 
reported to be university educated (n=123, 59%, 8 missing responses).  
 
Materials 
A taxidermied rabbit, Oryctolagus cuniculus, was donated from the Oxford University 
Museum of Natural History. It was approximately 35 cm long x 25 cm wide x 20 cm high. In 
the touchable condition, it was presented without a case, whereas in the encased condition 
it was enclosed in a transparent plastic display case. In the toy condition, the taxidermied 
rabbit was presented without a case, alongside a (touchable) toy rabbit that was a similar 
size, posture, and colour to the taxidermy (see Figure 1). 
 
   
Figure 1. The taxidermied rabbit in the touchable (left) and encased (middle) conditions, and 
toy rabbit (right) that was presented alongside the touchable taxidermy in the toy condition. 
 
  




Table 1: Demographic characteristics of participants in each condition, with child age in 
years and months (n=174) and adult age in years (n=33) 
                             Condition   
Age and gender 
Touchable 
(n = 72) 
Encased 
(n = 72) 
Toy 
(n = 63) 
Total 
(n = 207) 
4–5-year-olds      
  Mean age (range)  









  % females (n) 53 (10/19) 66 (12/18) 69 (9/13) 62 (31/50) 
6–7-year-olds     
 Mean age (range)  









  % females (n) 55 (12/22) 42 (10/24) 50 (10/20) 48 (32/66) 
8–10-year-olds     
 Mean age (range)  









  % females (n) 45 (9/20) 50 (9/18) 55 (11/20) 50 (29/58) 
Adults     
 Mean age (range)  


















Ethical approval was obtained from the researcher’s institution. Data collection took place in 
the Oxford University Museum of Natural History, U.K., in a public space on the museum 
floor in the main gallery. This gallery comprises exhibition cases containing, for example, 
dinosaur bones, minerals, fossils, insects, and taxidermied animals, as well as two complete 
dinosaur skeletons in the centre, which are not encased but visitors are forbidden to touch 
them. The taxidermied rabbit (touchable, encased, or with toy) was visible on a table, and 
conditions were tested separately over several days during the summer. Visitors who 
approached the table were informed about the study by an assistant. If they were willing to 
take part, or to allow their child to take part, informed written consent and demographic 
information were obtained. Children only took part if they also gave verbal assent. Next, 
participants were invited to sit down individually with a researcher at the table to answer 
questions. Caregivers/companions were politely requested not to interact with the 
participant during the interview.  
The interview began with some warm-up questions to see if participants could name 
the taxidermied animal, and to establish whether or not they liked it. All participants 
correctly named it as a rabbit, and 84% said that they liked it. During this stage, the 
researcher modelled touching the taxidermied rabbit in both the touchable and toy 
conditions, and encouraged participants to do the same. In the toy condition, participants 
were also encouraged to touch the toy rabbit to emphasise the fact that they should 
compare the two rabbits. The majority of participants spontaneously touched the 
taxidermied rabbit, and the remainder did so after the researcher.  
Participants were then asked whether they thought that the taxidermied rabbit was 
real, and to explain their response: ‘Is this rabbit real?’ and, ‘Why do you think it is real/not-




real?’ In the toy condition, participants were also asked these questions regarding the toy 
rabbit, and the order in which these questions focused on the taxidermied and toy rabbit 
was random. Subsequently, participants were asked questions about seven biological 
properties and two authenticity properties. The seven biological questions were: ‘Is this 
rabbit alive?’ ‘Does this rabbit need to eat?’ ‘Does this rabbit need to poo?’ ‘Does this rabbit 
move on its own?’ ‘Are there bones inside this rabbit?’ ‘Does this rabbit stay the same size?’ 
(reverse scored) and, ‘Is there a heart inside this rabbit?’ The two authenticity questions 
were: ‘Does this rabbit have real fur?’ and, ‘Does this rabbit have pretend eyes?’ All nine 
questions were asked in a random order. Next, the questions were repeated in the past 
tense to determine whether children thought that the property applied to the taxidermied 
rabbit in its previous state, for example, ‘Did this rabbit used to eat?’ These were also asked 
in a random order.  
In the toy condition, the same procedure was adopted, except that questions were 
asked alternately about the toy and the taxidermied rabbit. They were asked in a semi-
random order, so that the same question was not asked for the toy and taxidermy 
consecutively. The researcher pointed to the appropriate rabbit while asking the question. 




The data comprise participants’ reality judgments as well as their biological and 
authenticity property attributions. The first analysis explored the association between 
reality judgments (real authentic, not real artificial, real living, not real nonliving), age, and 
condition. The second analysis explored the accuracy of participants’ biological and 




authenticity property attributions as a function of age, condition, and reality judgment. Two 
key sources of variability in biological knowledge were also explored: pet ownership, and 
whether the participant lived in a rural or urban area. This was because children who own a 
pet as opposed to children who do not own a pet demonstrate more advanced biological 
reasoning (Inagaki, 1990; Geerdts, Van de Walle, & LoBue, 2015), as do children who live in 
rural areas as opposed to urban areas (Atran, Medin, Lynch, Vapnarsky, Ek et al., 2001; Ross, 
Medin, Coley, & Atran, 2003; Ganea, Canfield, Simons-Ghafari, & Chou, 2014). There were, 
however, no effects of pet ownership or location in any of the analyses so these were 
excluded from the findings. The analysis also checked for gender differences and found 
none, therefore gender was excluded in all analyses.  
 
Reality judgments  
The first analysis explored participants’ reality judgments for the taxidermy. 
Justifications for the reality judgments were allocated to one of three categories: 
living/nonliving (n=103, 50%), authentic/artificial (n=89, 43%), and uninformative (n=15, 
7%). A living/nonliving justification referred to the nature of the taxidermy in its current or 
previous state as a live or dead animal, e.g., It’s not moving all about and it’s stuck to this [6 
years]; It’s lived its life and it’s dead [9 years]; It’s stuffed so it’s not alive now [10 years]. An 
authentic/artificial justification referred to the authentic/artificial nature of a physical 
property or feature of the taxidermy, e.g., It has real fur and real actual ears [5 years]; I 
know what a rabbit looks like and feels like – it probably is real fur [Adult]; You can see in the 
eyes, they are plastic [8 years]; It looks more like a model [7 years]. Uninformative 
justifications provided irrelevant information, e.g., Rabbits are very tiny, or I have a rabbit at 
home. Coding was carried out by two coders who were blind to the hypothesis, age of the 




participant, and reality judgment. Agreement was 87.9% (Cohen’s κ=.833). Disagreements 
were resolved through discussion. 
An initial check confirmed that the toy rabbit was judged as not-real by 62/63 (98%) 
participants because it did not have authentic properties, e.g., It has fake fur. In the toy 
condition, therefore, the results are presented for the taxidermied rabbit only, not the toy 
rabbit.  
Each participant was subsequently allocated to one of four categories on the basis of 
their reality judgment for the taxidermy – real authentic, not real artificial, real living, not 
real nonliving. Participants who provided an uninformative justification, n=14, were 
excluded from analysis. The analysis attempted to explore the distribution of participants in 
these four categories according to age and condition, and the interaction between age and 
condition using a hierarchical loglinear analysis (see Figure 2). However, owing to low cell 
counts in some of the categories, it was not possible to explore the interaction, only the 
independent effects of age and condition. Looking at the data in Figure 2 suggests that the 
impact of condition was greater for children than adults, for example 4- and 5-year-olds 
gave predominantly not real nonliving judgments in the touchable and encased conditions 
but real authentic judgments in the toy condition. In contrast, adults gave predominantly 
real authentic judgments in all three conditions. Chi squared tests were instead conducted 
to determine how reality judgments were affected by age and condition independently.  
There was a significant association between age and reality judgment, χ²(6, 
N=193)=38.277, p<.001, ɸ=.445 (see Table 2). As expected, there was an overall trend for a 
developmental increase in the proportion of participants who judged taxidermy as real 
because it is authentic (26%, 29%, 49%, 68% for 4- and 5-year-olds, 6- and 7-year-olds, 8–10-
year-olds, and adults respectively) and a corresponding decrease in the number who judged 




it as not real because it is nonliving (51%, 39%, 17%, 10% for 4- and 5-year-olds, 6- and 7-
year-olds, 8–10-year-olds, and adults respectively).  
There was also a significant association between condition and reality judgment, 
χ²(6, N=193)=25.878, p<.001, ɸ=.20 (see Table 3). In support of the hypothesis, taxidermy 
was judged as real because it is authentic more often in the toy condition (62%) than in the 
touchable (32%) and encased (30%) conditions. However, these judgments were not given 
substantially more often in the touchable condition compared to the encased condition.  
 
Property attributions  
The next analysis explored participants’ attributions of properties relating to the 
living/nonliving distinction, referred to as biological properties, and the authentic/artificial 
distinction, referred to as authenticity properties, according to age, condition, and reality 
judgment. Correct responses to both current and previous state versions of each question 
were awarded a joint score of 1, thus participants had to answer both questions correctly to 
achieve this score. The mean scores for participants in each age group for each question are 










    
Figure 2. Percentage of participants in each age group in the touchable condition (left), encased condition (middle) and toy condition (right) who 


































































Table 2: Percentage of participants in each age group who gave each reality judgment  
 Age group 
Reality judgment 4- and 5-year-olds 6- and 7-year-olds 8–10-year- olds Adults 
Real, authentic 26 29 49 68 
Real, living  9 21 11 23 
Not real, artificial 14 11 23 0 
Not real, nonliving 51 39 17 10 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
 
Table 3: Percentage of participants in each condition who gave each reality judgment  
 Condition 
Reality judgment Touchable Encased Toy 
Real, authentic 32 30 62 
Real, living  17 14 15 
Not real, artificial 22 9 8 
Not real, nonliving 29 47 15 













4- and 5-year-olds 6- and 7-year-olds 8–10-year-olds Adults 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Biological 








(0.47) 1 (0) 
Eat 0.38 (0.49) 0.52 (0.50) 0.57 (0.50) 0.94 (0.24) 
Poo 0.38 (0.49) 0.48 (0. 50) 0.59 (0.50) 0.85 (0.36) 
Move 0.50 (0.50) 0.58 (0. 50) 0.60 (0.50) 0.91 (0.29) 
Bones 0.18 (0.39) 0.42 (0. 50) 0.36 (0.49) 0.45 (0.51) 
Same size 0.18 (0.39) 0.52 (0. 50) 0.59 (0.50) 0.82 (0.39) 
Heart 0.20 (0.40) 0.52 (0. 50) 0.62 (0.50) 0.97 (0.17) 
Mean 0.38 (0.30) 0.56 (0.36) 0.61 (0.41) 0.91 (0.18) 
Authenticity 








(0.35) 0.97 (0.17) 
Eyes 0.66 (0.48) 0.67 (0.48) 0.81 (0.40) 0.91 (0.18) 
Mean 0.66 (0.29) 0.77 (0.25) 0.84 (0.24) 0.94 (0.17) 
 
Owing to the different number of questions that comprised the biological and 
authenticity property scores (seven and two respectively), each participant was given a 
score from 0 to 1 that represented the proportion of questions correct in each scale. Factor 
analysis on the nine property questions confirmed that there were two distinct scales, 
biological and authenticity. Each item, except for the bones question, loaded above .65 onto 
their respective scales, therefore, the bones question was removed from the analysis.  




An initial check confirmed that participants largely correctly allocated properties to 
the toy rabbit. A 2 (Property: biological, authenticity) x 4 (Age: 4- and 5-year-olds, 6- and 7-
year-olds, 8–10-year-olds, adults) x 4 (Reality judgment: real authentic, real living, not real 
artificial, not real nonliving) MANOVA was conducted to explore the effects of age and 
condition on accuracy of property attributions for the toy. Performance was near ceiling for 
both biological properties (M = .95, 95% CI [.90, .99]) and authenticity properties (M = .97, 
95% CI [.92, 1.02]), and there were no effects of age or reality judgment on accuracy, nor 
interactions between the two (Fs<1.246, ps>.304).  
Subsequently, a 2 (Property: biological, authenticity) x 4 (Age: 4- and 5-year-olds, 6- 
and 7-year-olds, 8–10-year-olds, adults) x 3 (Condition: touchable, encased, toy) x 4 (Reality 
judgment: real authentic, real living, not real artificial, not real nonliving) MANOVA was 
conducted to explore the effects of age, condition, and reality judgment on accuracy of 
biological and authenticity property attributions for the taxidermy. 
For biological property attributions, the main effect of age was significant, 
F(3,193)=3.193, p<.005, η2=.085 (see Figure 3). Adults made more accurate biological 
property attributions (M = .87, 95% CI [.71, 1.03]) than 4- and 5-year-olds (M = .38, 95% CI 
[.23, .52]), p<.001, 6- and 7-year-olds (M = .52, 95% CI [.41, .63]), p<.002, and somewhat 
more than 8–10-year-olds (M = .61, 95% CI [.50, .73]), p=.073. Furthermore, 8–10-year-olds 
made somewhat more accurate biological property attributions than 4- and 5-year-olds, 
p=.07, but there were no other age differences, ps>.74. This general pattern of an increase 
in accuracy with age supports the hypothesis that understanding the biological  
nature of taxidermy continues to develop during childhood but approaches an adult 
understanding between 8 and 10 years of age.   




The main effect of condition on biological property attributions was also significant, 
F(2,193)=3.306, p<.04, η2=.048. Pairwise comparisons indicated that biological property 
attributions were marginally more accurate in the touchable condition (M = .67, 95% CI [.58, 
.76]) compared to the toy condition (M = .50, 95% CI [.37, .62]), p<.09, but accuracy in the 
encased condition was not different from the other two conditions (M = .56, 95% CI [.44, 
.68]), ps>.45. This does not support the hypothesis that accuracy would be highest in the toy 
condition, nor the hypothesis that accuracy would be higher in the touchable condition 
compared to the encased condition. 
Finally, the main effect of reality judgment on biological property attributions was 
also significant, F(3,193)=4.536, p<.005, η2=.083. As expected, pairwise comparisons 
indicated that accuracy of biological property attributions was higher following judgments 
of real authentic (M = .66, 95% CI [.57, .76]), real living (M = .74, 95% CI [.60, .88]), and not 
real nonliving (M = .58, 95% CI [.45, .70]) compared with not real artificial judgments (M = 
.25, 95% CI [.08, .42]), ps<.01. There were no other significant differences in accuracy 
between the other types of reality judgments, ps>.479.  
The two way interactions and the three way interaction between the main effects 
were not significant, Fs<0.901, ps>.560. 
For authenticity property attributions (see Figure 4) the main effect of age 
approached significance, F(3,193)=2.465, p<.07, η2=.047. Pairwise comparisons did not, 
however, indicate any significant differences between any of the age groups, ps>.104. There 
was no main effect of condition, F(2,193)=1.998, p=.139, or reality judgment, 
F(3,193)=1.482, p=.222, and the two way interactions and the three way interaction 
between the main effects were not significant, Fs<1.175, ps>.318.





   
Figure 3. Proportion of accurate attributions of biological properties (maximum 1) according to age group and reality judgment in the touchable 
condition (left), encased condition (middle) and toy condition (right). Numbers in the toy condition refer only to the taxidermied rabbit, not the toy 





























































   
Figure 4. Proportion of accurate attributions of authenticity properties (maximum 1) according to age group and reality judgment in the touchable 
condition (left), encased condition (middle) and toy condition (right). Numbers in the toy condition refer only to the taxidermied rabbit, not the toy 


































































The current study investigated children’s and adults’ understanding of the reality 
status of a taxidermied rabbit in a museum of natural history to explore the development of 
the ability to categorise it as a real authentic piece of natural history, and to attribute 
properties on the basis of the living/nonliving distinction and the authentic/artificial 
distinction. This study revealed that the majority – approximately two thirds – of adults 
categorised museum taxidermy as real owing to its authentic physical features. In contrast, 
the number of children who made this judgment increased with age from approximately 
one quarter of 4- and 5-year-olds to one half of 8–10-year-olds. The most common response 
among 4–7-year-olds was that it is not real because it is nonliving. This supports Tunnicliffe’s 
(1996) interpretation that children seem to refer to the ‘realness’ of taxidermy in terms of 
its nonliving status. By categorising taxidermy in this way children appeared to be relying on 
their naïve theory knowledge of the living/nonliving distinction (c.f. Gelman, 2003) to 
recognize the absence of biological properties and infer that it is not alive. With increasing 
age, however, children, like adults, used this knowledge to support their categorization of 
taxidermy as real because it has authentic properties.   
Adults also accurately attributed biological and authenticity properties to taxidermy. 
They understood, for example, that the taxidermied rabbit used to have a heart inside, but 
that this was no longer the case (biological property), and that it has real fur (authenticity 
property). With age, children’s attribution of biological properties increased in accuracy, but 
accuracy of authenticity properties did not increase. Their ability to attribute a range of 
biological properties supports and extends previous research on children’s understanding of 
the distinction between living/nonliving kinds and artifacts (e.g., Inagaki & Hatano, 2002; 
Jipson & Gelman, 2007; Jaakkola & Slaughter, 2002). Notably, it goes beyond previous 




research to demonstrate their ability to reason about the current and past status of a dead 
animal that has been preserved for display in a museum. Young children’s ability to attribute 
authenticity properties in an adult-like manner also supports previous research showing 
that young children can distinguish between real and unreal objects and entities on the 
basis of the authentic/artificial nature of physical features (e.g., Bunce & Harris, 2013).  
Another aspect of the current study was the impact of the context in which 
participants made their judgments. Participants responded to questions about the 
taxidermied rabbit either as a touchable exhibit, inside an exhibition case, or in a pair with a 
toy rabbit. In line with the hypothesis, all groups of children, and to some extent adults, 
categorised taxidermy as real because of its authentic physical features more often in the 
toy condition compared to the other two conditions. This was particularly the case for 4- 
and 5-year-olds. Bunce and Harris (2013) proposed that a toy replica of an animal helps 
children make reality status judgments by enabling them to actively compare real and 
unreal versions, and that toy replicas provide a familiar context within which to interpret 
the reality status question. In the current study, children’s justifications suggested that the 
toy did highlight perceptual/sensory differences between the authentic and artificial 
features of the toy and taxidermy, most notably the quality of the fur. The toy condition did 
not appear to increase children’s use of conceptual or naïve theory-based cues, because it 
did not increase judgments that the taxidermied rabbit is not real because it is not alive.  
In terms of the effect of condition on participants’ property attributions, the results 
did not support the hypothesis that biological and authenticity property attributions would 
be more accurate in the toy condition than the touchable and encased conditions. Biological 
property attributions were marginally less accurate in the toy condition than the touchable 
condition, but not different from the encased condition, whereas there was no effect of 




condition on authenticity property attributions. This is surprising because it was expected 
that the toy condition would provide more perceptual/sensory information and conceptual 
information to facilitate participants’ attributions of both biological and authenticity 
properties. It seems that the toy served a more narrow function than anticipated by only 
supporting participants’ reality status judgments. Property attribution questions were, it 
seems, inherently less ambiguous and did not benefit from the context provided by the toy.  
The second hypothesis with respect to condition, that reality judgments and 
property attributions would be higher in the touchable condition compared to the encased 
condition, received only minimal support. In relation to participants’ reality judgments, 
there was evidence that adults were more likely to categorise taxidermy as real because it is 
authentic in the touchable condition than the encased condition, but this did not seem to be 
the case for children. Touch did not, therefore, seem to serve a special function in this 
regard. In terms of biological property attributions, accuracy was marginally higher in the 
touchable condition compared to the toy condition, but not different to the encased 
condition. This was surprising given that touch has been considered by some to help visitors 
interpret museum objects (c.f. Van Kraayenoord & Paris, 2002; Pye, 2008), but the current 
results suggest that further research is required to explore more fully the impact of touch on 
visitors’ understanding and interpretation of taxidermy.   
Bringing the findings together from participants’ reality judgments and property 
attributions revealed that participants who judged taxidermy as real because it is authentic 
also attributed more biological properties accurately than participants who judged it as not 
real because it is not authentic. This indicates that these participants understood both that 
taxidermy is real and authentic, as well as not real because it is not alive, owing to the 
absence of biological properties. Given that the number of participants who judged 




taxidermy as real and authentic was highest in the toy condition, this indicates that the toy 
condition was effective in producing this pattern of responses. Further research is required 
to confirm these patterns, but the current data suggest that the toy condition provided a 
useful way of helping children to consider the reality status of taxidermy in terms of its 
status as a real, authentic museum exhibit and as a previously living animal.  
Although the findings provide new insights into the development of children’s 
understanding of taxidermy, there are some limitations of the research. First, the sample 
was limited to museum visitors who were mostly white, well-educated, and had previously 
visited a natural history museum. In addition, participants were only questioned about one 
piece of animal taxidermy - a rabbit. It remains an open question as to how children would 
perceive more exotic or potentially dangerous animals that have been taxidermied, such as 
an elephant. Another issue was that a minority of participants (16%) responded that 
taxidermy is real because it was alive, suggesting that they potentially made a metaphorical 
or non-literal interpretation of the question (Jipson & Gelman, 2007). In other words, 
participants may have responded to the questions as if they were about rabbits in general, 
not about the taxidermied rabbit itself. Although the questions were phrased to try to 
eliminate this interpretation, future research may include a training session to make it clear 
that a literal interpretation is intended. 
In summary, this research explored children’s and adults’ intuitions about museum 
taxidermy to examine whether they categorise it as a real – as in authentic – piece of 
natural history, and whether they can correctly attribute properties to it on the basis of the 
living/nonliving and authentic/artificial distinctions. Most adults categorised taxidermy as 
real because it is authentic, but there was a developmental increase in the number of 
children who made this judgment. In the context provided by a toy version of the taxidermy, 




children, and to some extent adults, were more likely to categorise taxidermy as real 
because it is authentic. Judgments of authenticity were subsequently followed by more 
accurate attributions of biological properties compared to judgments of inauthenticity, 
suggesting that a mature understanding that taxidermy is real and authentic is underpinned 
by an understanding that it used to be alive. These are important findings because 
knowingly interacting with authentic museum objects is thought to be more engaging, and 
provide more educational impact, than interacting with models or replicas (Bunce, 2016a; 
Bunce 2016b; Dillon et al., 2016; Evans, Mull, & Poling, 2002; Hampp & Schwan, 2014; 
Kirchberg & Tröndle, 2012; Leinhardt & Crowley, 2002; Watson & Werb, 2013). Supporting 
children’s intuitions about the real, authentic nature of museum taxidermy, perhaps by 
comparing them with toy animals, may provide museums with a simple way to engage their 
young visitors more effectively. The impact of context on museum visitors’ intuitions about 
taxidermy warrants further investigation so that taxidermy can be used to support the 
development of knowledge about the natural world. 
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